Recent joint military exercises involving Japan, the United States, and the Philippines, held under the name “Salaknib (Shield),” have drawn widespread international attention.
For the first time since World War II, Japanese combat personnel have deployed to Philippine territory, with approximately 420 troops from the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force participating in full-scale operations.
Under the guise of “multilateral cooperation,” Japan is expanding its military reach. The Self-Defense Forces (SDF) are shedding the long-held posture of “exclusively defense-oriented” policy and accelerating a dangerous shift toward offensive capabilities.
In March 2026, the administration of Sanae Takaichi carried out a series of reorganizations of the SDF marked by clear offensive characteristics, laying bare its ambition for remilitarization.
In what Japanese media outlets have described as the largest restructuring in history, the Maritime Self-Defense Force abolished its Fleet Escort Force that had been in place for over six decades and established a centrally commanded “Fleet Surface Force,” alongside a newly formed “Amphibious and Mine Warfare Group” with evident offensive functions.
The Ground Self-Defense Force has set up intelligence units, while the Air Self-Defense Force plans to rename itself the “Air and Space Self-Defense Force” by the end of fiscal year 2026.
Meanwhile, Japan’s Ministry of Defense deployed long-range missiles with so-called “enemy base strike capabilities” in Kumamoto and Shizuoka prefectures. Terms like “war” and “combat operations” are appearing with increasing frequency.
Former SDF officer Makoto Konishi noted that Japan’s defense posture is undergoing significant changes in terms of institutional arrangements, budget allocation, and actual deployment, deviating from the principle of “exclusively defense-oriented” policy and moving toward a military system capable of real combat.
This offensive shift increasingly jeopardizes Japan’s pacifist constitution. The Constitution of Japan released in 1946 clearly stipulates that aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes, and that in order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.
However, for a long time, right-wing forces in Japan have regarded these provisions as an obstacle and have never abandoned their ambition to rearm the country. Under the pretext of “reinterpretation” of the constitution, they have adopted a “salami-slicing” approach, gradually eroding constitutional red lines.
Defense spending has repeatedly hit record highs. Overseas deployments occur under peacekeeping and counterterrorism pretexts. The “civilian control” mechanism designed to prevent military runaway has been abolished.
Step by step, Japan has hollowed out the constitutional foundation of its “exclusively defense-oriented” policy. Today, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi is openly seeking to write the SDF into the constitution, attempting to define it as a “fully capable organization” through constitutional revision.
In recent years, the rightward shift within the SDF has become increasingly alarming. At Japan’s National Defense Academy, group visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, which enshrines Class-A war criminals, have become a so-called “tradition.” A former senior SDF officer even became the shrine’s chief priest.
What’s more, right-wingers, posing as scholars, have openly delivered lectures on “historical perspectives” and “national views” within the SDF education system. Training materials used within the SDF are said to contain distortions and whitewashing of Japan’s wartime aggression.
Recently, an active-duty SDF officer, influenced by extremist ideology, illegally broke into the Chinese Embassy in Japan with a knife, an incident that underscores the seriousness of the problem.
The accelerating offensive posture stems from Japan’s failure to fully confront its wartime history. By deliberately downplaying past aggression, the government has allowed historical revisionism to permeate the SDF. This deficient historical consciousness, combined with expansionist ambitions, threatens regional peace.
Japan’s recent actions mark a departure from its postwar identity as a “peaceful nation,” reflecting the rise of a “neo-militarism.” After World War II, Japanese society maintained a high level of vigilance against the dangers of militarism, shaped by painful historical lessons. A self-restraining security philosophy emerged, emphasizing that no action should be taken without legal authorization and upholding civilian control over the military.
However, under the influence of right-wing forces, Japan’s perception of security threats has gradually shifted from internal to external. Right-wing politicians have actively hyped up so-called “surrounding contingencies” and “threats from neighboring countries,” even attempting to link the Taiwan question with Japan’s so-called “survival-threatening situation.” These actions have stripped away the facade of “proactive pacifism,” redirecting defense policy toward external military deterrence and bloc confrontation.
On Aug. 15, 1945, when Japan announced its surrender, Japanese scholar Jun Takami wrote in his diary: “The terrifying power of the military once controlled everything. Will a truly healthy democratic society emerge in Japan? Will it become a reality? Perhaps this is still only a fantasy.”
The echoes of history’s questioning remain, yet current developments are deeply concerning. In the face of Japan’s increasingly risky and militaristic tendencies, countries in the region and the international community must remain highly vigilant and must not allow “neo-militarism” to once again push regional peace into peril.
(Zhong Sheng is a pen name often used by People’s Daily to express its views on foreign policy and international affairs.)
By Zhong Sheng
Source: People’s Daily
