In December 2025, precisely on Christmas day, the US launched deadly strikes against terrorists linked to the Islamic State group (IS) in north-western Nigeria.

The US Tomahawk missiles and drones targeted and struck Islamic State-linked camps in Sokoto State, underpinning Washington’s first of its kind acknowledged combat action inside the most populous country in the African continent.

According to Yusuf Maitama Tuggar, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, the attack was a ”joint operation” and had been planned” for quite some time,” using intelligence provided by Nigeria.

Two months down the line, the US and Iran had commenced a major conflict in the Middle East that if not properly or diplomatically managed, would snowball into a full-blown war, in that the Iran’s Strait of Hormuz has been under the naval blockade of the US.

Thus, from oil shocks to proxy protests in Abuja, Nigeria now found itself fielding offers of counterterrorism help from both Tehran and Washington.Currently, the war between Iran and the US is not contained or restricted to the borders of Tehran and Levant.

In the last five months, it has crossed the Strait of Hormuz, entered Nigeria’s diplomatic rooms in Abuja, and echoed in forests of the northwest and northeast, particularly Sokoto and Borno.

For a country already fighting Boko Haram, Islamic State West Africa Province, Lakurawa, a bandit-insurgent hybrid in the northwest, northeast, northcentral and the harrowing kidnappings, killings and attacks from the activities of unknown gunmen in the southeast, the Middle East escalation is altering counterterrorism through three pivots: economics, alliances and ideology.When Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz in March 2026 after U.S. and Israeli strikes on its nuclear facilities, Brent crude jumped to $105.63 per barrel.

S&P Global, while affirming the sovereign credit ratings of Ghana and Morocco, maintained that Nigeria, as a net exporter of crude oil, is “less exposed” than many African states and could see fiscal gains. Yet, the same shock raised domestic costs.

Former Finance Minister Wale Edun said the Hormuz closure “is already pushing up crude prices and could raise domestic costs for fuel, diesel, fertiliser and cooking gas”.

The above to a larger extent matters so much to terrorism and counterterrorism in that poverty and unemployment remain core drivers of recruitment.

According to some experts on security matters in Nigeria, Borno youth are vulnerable to “radical offers” when legitimate livelihoods collapse.

Though oil windfalls can fund security operations, however, if inflation outruns salaries and farming inputs, the recruitment pool deepens.

Going by the research and security assessment in early 2026, including data from Global Terrorism Index (GTI) released in March 19, this year, researchers opined that Nigeria experienced the largest year-on-year increase in terrorism-related deaths globally in early 2026, thus ranking 4th most impacted country.

This was as a result of the impact of the global oil crisis which drove up domestic fuel and transportation costs, increasing inflationary pressures, according to analysts.Eminent Nigerian leaders and groups have reacted very strongly to this combination of escalated terror and economic distress, essentially following a series of mass killings in some states in the northcentral and renewed threats from groups like Lakurawa in the northwest.

Similarly, the conflict in the Middle East has turned Nigeria into a diplomatic prize. This is so because on March 8, 2026, Ambassador Gholamreza Mahdavi Raja, Iran’s ambassador to Nigeria told Arise TV that “Nigeria faces security challenges from Boko Haram and ISWAP; Tehran condemns terrorism globally and is ready to support Nigeria’s fight against Boko haram, ISWAP and all forms of terrorism”.

This move according to some scholars, was in response to Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sharren Haskel’s visit to Abuja in 2025, where she stated that Israel will share “advanced skills, capability, and technologies” from its Gaza campaign and train Nigerian officials on border security and in addition, accused Iran of being a “global exporter of terror” and asserted that Nigeria has “been on the receiving end of terrorism from Iran”.

The risk here is that of polarization. If Tel Aviv’s Africa policy focuses on military and intelligence area, Iran could establish spheres of influence through the ‘Islamic Movement of Nigeria.

For Nigeria’s military, the risk is that counterterrorism partnerships become entangled in a web of a wider Middle East rivalry.

As Defence Minister Christopher Gwabin Musa (RTD) puts it at the 5th Antalya Diplomacy Forum (ADF2026), the “greatest barrier” to cooperation is “confidence in intelligence sharing”.

The conflict in the Middle East has already graduated from embassies to streets as members of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria staged protests in some parts of the country.

Security experts noted that the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) has historically organised protests in solidarity with Iran and chants “Death to America, Death to Israel.”

Even in times of peace and respite, previous IMN protests have led to deadly clashes with security forces in Nigeria.

No wonder the Federal Government of Nigeria through the Nigerian Christian Pilgrim Commission (NCPC), halted all Christian pilgrimages to Israel and the West Bank in early March 2026, evacuating over 300 Nigerians due to hostilities and escalating conflicts in the Middle East.

The decision underscores how a foreign war proportionately constraints Nigerian religious freedoms while stretching security resources that would otherwise focus on domestic terror groups.

Further, the migration of battlefield innovation such as drones and arms flows or networks into Nigeria are another cause for concern.

For instance, ISWAP has started using armed drones in Borno State, just as the security report suggests that Iran is “alleged to be a major sponsor of Islamic radicalism” with “suspected links” to IMN, and has been accused of shipping arms into Nigeria.

In this regard, ambassador Olutoyin Oloniteru, a foreign policy expert, warned that “extremist groups in Iran might consider leveraging their networks in the Sahel to transfer arms to their terrorist affiliates and proxies in Nigeria”.

In the totality of the above, it is expedient to state that the role of the US engagement and presence in Nigeria cannot be over-emphasized. Currently, the U.S. has deployed roughly 200 military personnel to Nigeria to support intelligence gathering and provide training for anti-terrorism efforts, with personnel utilizing MQ-9 drones to strengthen local forces against insurgent groups.

In the same vein, recently, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) Commander, Gen Michael Langley has reiterated that the United States is actively ”partnering with Nigeria to counter-terrorism,” focusing on an ”African-led, US-enabled” approach. Yet the Observer Research Foundation cautions that the U.S. approach is “transactional” and Nigeria “must bargain hard” so its interests are not subordinated.

Be that as it may, it is significant to state that kinetic action alone has not broken or been able to fight terrorism in Nigeria to a standstill.

Nigeria is diversifying its security strategies but the dilemma however remains that every new partner imports its own rivalry.

Nigeria needs to find the credible sync and political will to move from episodic reactions to a more unified clear, cut out philosophy.