As the world busiest oil choke-point continues to throw the globe into a limbo of uncertainties and with the threat to remain a combat zone not far-fetched, Hormuz has certainly changed the US supply map and strategy for crude to the extent that the oil of any tanker or ship that bypasses it carries a wartime premium.
That premium is already in West Africa. As it were, Nigeria Bonny Light, renowned for being easy and less expensive to process as compared to the heavy crude (heavy and soar), is one of Nigeria’s premier crude oil grades that often trade high. As a high-quality, low-sulphur sweet crude, the demands for Bonny Light is often premium over others regardless that crude oil prices are highly volatile.
According to J.P. Morgan, about 4.7 million bpd of the Gulf supply of crude oil is currently at risk, and as such, a non-Hormuz barrel is no longer just a commodity, but a hedge. Many East Coast and Gulf Coast refineries are optimized for light, sweet crude — the same specification Nigeria produces. As such, to the U.S. policymakers, the problem is twofold: price and grade. Thus, with Brent holding above $100, U.S. refiners and the White House are scanning the map for secure barrels. Nigeria is endowed with the right crude and geography. Whether it has the capacity, credibility, and policy discipline to become a strategic U.S. supplier is the harder question. Regardless how that turns out to be, one question that remains to be unanswered is, ”will the US and the Trump’s administration convert this market logic and look to Nigeria for its oil?
Owing to the recent disruptions and conflict that have raised very dire concerns over the reliability of the Strait of Hormuz shipping route, Africa is emerging as a central player in global energy and trade logistics. Presently, Iraq and the Gulf states have accelerated efforts to bypass the Strait of Hormuz. According to available shipping data, shipping through the Strait of Hormuz has petered by as much as 90 percent, forcing vessels to detour along coastline. As such, attention is increasingly shifting toward Africa’s Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and Atlantic corridors as potential options. These recent shifts are already manifesting in shipping patterns. Major operators and firms such as Maersk, Hapag-Lloyd and CMA CGM have already rerouted vessels around the Cape of Good Hope, thus reinforcing Africa’s role as a reliable alternative corridor.
To President Donald Trump, the response to the conflict in the Middle East is tantamount to what the Pentagon calls ”force protection”. The oil market calls it a shopping list and Nigeria is top on that list. Force protection simply means that President Trump would either order the US Navy escorts to the Strait of Hormuz or hold emergency consultations with refiners on ”diversification of non-Gulf supply.’’
The United States refiners are already paying attention to Nigeria’s oil. The price spread, the naval posture, and the policy chatter confirm it. Since 2024, the United States has remained one of the top five destinations of Nigerian crude. Official data shows that the US has overtaken the Netherlands the biggest buyer of Nigerian crude oil in the first nine months of 2024. Factly speaking, between January and September 2024, the US purchased a N3.64 trillion worth of Nigerian crude, underscoring its position as one of the top buyers of Nigeria’s crude, especially for its Gulf refineries modelled to process light crude.
Based on 2026 reports, the US is actively engaging in increased oil trade with West Africa, including Nigeria, as the conflict in the Strait of Hormuz continues to create major disruptions in the Middle Eastern energy supplies. Thus, between January and February 2026, Nigeria exported about 55.39 million barrels of crude to the US. The Central Bank of Nigeria data (CBN), showed that the country shipped out 31.31 million barrels in January and 24.08 million barrels in February.
Suffice it to state that historically, this strategic trajectory embarked by the United States is not new as every major disruption in the Persian Gulf since 1973 has produced a temporary re-rating of Nigerian crude in Washington. For instance, in the 1973-74 Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) Arab Oil Embargo, during the Yom Kippur war, the United States imported about 4 percent of its oil from Nigeria. By 1977, it went up to 19 percent as Nigeria’s Bonny oil replaced the embargoed Arab crude. It is instructive to note that it was this shock which started in October 1973 that subsequently let to the establishment of the first US-Nigeria Strategic Energy dialogue in June, 2023.
In the same token, in the 2003 Iraq War, Gulf supply became uncertain and very precarious. In order to curtail the uncertainties, the George W. Bush administration designated West Africa a “strategic interest” and accelerated the creation of AFRICOM IN 2007. As a result, Nigerian exports to the U.S. peaked at 1.1 million bpd in 2006. Shale and Gulf of Guinea insecurity then pushed Nigeria out of the U.S. import slate by 2014.
In conclusion, it is imperative to state that be that as it may, three basic factors, that is; the US Energy doctrine, Nigeria’s scale of production and Partner behaviour will shape the Trump’s administration position in deciding whether to elevate Nigeria from a spot-seller to a strategic partner as the Hormuz choke-point continues to create a security premium for non-Gulf barrels.
