Amid escalating insecurity across the country, President Bola Ahmed Tinubu has stated that problems in the Sahel region, comprising Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, are predominantly fuelling insecurity in Nigeria. The President made this declaration on Thursday, July 30, when the Olubadan of Ibadan, Oba Rashidi Ladoja, paid him a courtesy visit at the Presidential Villa in Abuja.
While the President’s assertion has some validity as a broad regional observation, it does not adequately explain the deeply rooted and multifaceted challenges confronting Nigeria today. A comprehensive assessment requires moving beyond generalised regional explanations to address fundamental domestic problems, including corruption, maladministration, macroeconomic instability, institutional decay and social inequality.
“They committed murder by killing one of the teachers, and we were ready to finish with members of their families. Some of them are non-Nigerians. You see the problem in Mali, Burkina Faso, and the Niger Republic. It’s adding more fuel to our challenges. That is why we must enhance the capacity of the forest guards and create state police,” the President stated.
Strengthening forest guards and establishing state police are notable administrative measures that could improve national security. However, addressing localised symptoms without confronting systemic drivers such as corruption, poverty, economic hardship, maladministration and structural inequality will not resolve the country’s insecurity.
If we accept that Nigeria’s insecurity is predominantly imported, we risk avoiding responsibility for the conditions created at home. Instability in the Sahel undoubtedly places additional pressure on Nigeria, but the restoration of peace in the region would not automatically end the country’s domestic security crisis.
Unlike the Sahel region, where the modern escalation of insecurity began in 2012, Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country, has experienced severe terrorist attacks since 2009, following the killing of Mohammed Yusuf, the founder of Boko Haram, in Maiduguri, Borno State. Since then, insecurity has taken different forms, including Boko Haram, the Islamic State West Africa Province, ethno-religious conflicts, trafficking in women and children, farmer-herder conflicts and related armed violence, banditry and kidnapping. These have caused immense harm to ordinary people.
From a political-economy perspective, economic conditions profoundly influence social order, legal institutions and public security. As Karl Marx argued in the preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy in 1859, political and legal structures are closely connected to the material conditions of society. When an economy is in crisis, and legitimate opportunities for employment and livelihood disappear, criminal and armed groups find it easier to recruit members, while public trust and institutional stability deteriorate. Economic failure can therefore become a major driver of crime and insecurity.
Nigeria’s security challenges are closely connected to the deterioration of the economy and the decline of legitimate means of livelihood. Although armed groups may cross porous borders, the Sahel did not create the violence in Plateau or Benue. It did not create the police extortion and repression in Delta State that contributed to the #EndSARS protests of October 2020. Neither did it cause the #EndBadGovernance protests of August 2024, the country’s multidimensional poverty, or the large-scale plundering of public resources.
Persistent insecurity in Nigeria therefore stems not only from regional instability but also from deep domestic socioeconomic and institutional vulnerabilities. To achieve lasting stability, policymakers must address the critical internal factors sustaining violence.
Corruption and Maladministration
Official corruption remains deeply embedded in Nigeria’s political system. Reports frequently emerge of public officials diverting resources intended for functional schools, properly equipped hospitals, factories and other essential services for personal benefit. Funds meant to provide safety nets for the poorest members of society have also been embezzled.
In Transparency International’s 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index, Nigeria scored 26 out of 100 and ranked 142nd out of 182 countries and territories. The index measures perceived levels of public-sector corruption, with lower scores indicating more serious corruption concerns.
Corruption discourages international investment, weakens public institutions, and contributes significantly to Nigeria’s economic difficulties.
Government policies over the past four decades have also worsened the situation. From the Structural Adjustment Programme of 1986, import-dependent economic policies and the continuous devaluation of the naira to the removal of fuel subsidies without adequate social protection and the floating of the naira without sufficient industrial buffers, the Nigerian economy has become severely disoriented. Hunger itself has become a security issue.
Consider a 20-year-old man in Borno State who has no job, no access to education and little hope. If an armed group offers him money and a motorcycle, economic exclusion and the absence of viable alternatives may make him vulnerable to recruitment. Such a situation cannot be explained solely by instability in the Sahel.
A Weak Judicial System
Nigeria’s weak judicial system is another consequence of corruption and institutional failure, and it has become a major contributor to insecurity. Citizens feel unsafe when criminals and terrorists appear to escape punishment. The widespread belief that money can purchase freedom further erodes confidence in the justice system.
Wealthy and politically connected individuals are often perceived as capable of avoiding accountability, while poor citizens face a system that is slow, expensive, and frequently inaccessible.
One controversial example occurred on March 7, 2025, when the Supreme Court upheld the death sentence imposed on Sunday Jackson, a farmer from Adamawa State. The case arose from a 2015 altercation on his farm in Kodomti village, Numan Local Government Area, in which he killed a herder, Buba Bawuro, after being stabbed during a confrontation.
The case intensified public debate about self-defence, proportional sentencing and access to justice for vulnerable citizens. For many Nigerians, the judiciary is increasingly perceived not as the last hope of the oppressed, but as an institution that works more effectively for the powerful. Restoring confidence in the judicial system requires greater transparency, fairness and accountability.
The Politicisation and Weaponisation of Security
The politicisation of security has also contributed significantly to Nigeria’s crisis. Since the beginning of the Fourth Republic, security has frequently been used as a political instrument, particularly through unaccountable “security votes”.
Other examples include amnesty programmes that paid militants without creating sustainable employment, as well as the creation and subsequent abandonment of the Civilian Joint Task Force and local vigilante groups without proper demobilisation and reintegration plans.
An analysis of approved budget documents found that 32 state governments allocated a combined ₦525.23 billion to security votes and related operations between 2023 and 2025. Four states did not clearly disclose their allocations, while Ekiti State’s 2025 allocation was also unclear, indicating that the actual total may have been higher. The figure represents approved budget allocations, not necessarily the amount ultimately spent.
The governance of these funds remains weak and opaque, with security votes often disconnected from standard institutional planning, public financial management and accountability systems.
When security becomes a political patronage mechanism for winning elections or consolidating power, it ceases to focus primarily on the safety and welfare of citizens. This creates distrust, encourages self-help and contributes to further violence.
Unemployment and Poverty
Many people recruited by criminal and armed groups are young people who cannot find legitimate means of survival. Nigerian youths bear a substantial share of this burden because they make up a large proportion of the population.
Under the National Bureau of Statistics’ current labour-force methodology, the unemployment rate among young people aged 15 to 24 was 6.5 per cent in the second quarter of 2024, down from 8.4 per cent in the first quarter. However, 12.5 per cent of young people were not in employment, education or training, while informal employment across the wider labour market remained extremely high at 93 per cent.
These figures demonstrate that the unemployment rate alone does not fully capture the vulnerability of young Nigerians. Informal, unstable and poorly paid work, limited access to education and the absence of sustainable livelihoods can also leave young people exposed to recruitment by criminal and armed organisations.
When young people cannot find legitimate employment or sustainable means of survival, they become more vulnerable to exploitation by groups offering money, protection or a sense of belonging.
The Police, Social Justice and Impunity
The misconduct of the now-disbanded Special Anti-Robbery Squad, a tactical unit of the Nigeria Police Force established in 1992, was not created by the crisis in the Sahel.
According to the National Human Rights Commission, it received 3,724,822 human rights-related complaints across its offices in 2025. The figure represents complaints received by the commission, rather than an equivalent number of independently investigated and confirmed violations.
Hilary Ogbonna, Senior Human Rights Adviser to the commission, linked the complaints to systemic problems, including inequality, unemployment, weak institutions and limited access to justice.
When citizens fear the police more than they fear criminals, they are less likely to provide intelligence. When court cases continue for years, people may resort to taking justice into their own hands. When suspected kidnappers are arrested and released a few months later, the public receives the impression that crime carries few consequences.
The 2020 #EndSARS protests were not about the Sahel. They reflected a broken social contract between the state and its citizens, a contract that has yet to be fully repaired.
What the Government Must Do
There is no doubt that the Sahel is facing a severe security crisis and that instability in the region affects Nigeria. However, presenting the Sahel as the predominant source of Nigeria’s insecurity risks overlooking the domestic conditions that allow violence and criminality to grow.
To reduce insecurity, Nigeria must improve the material conditions of its people by addressing corruption and maladministration, strengthening the judicial and security systems, expanding legitimate employment opportunities and reducing poverty. Public institutions must also become more transparent and accountable to the citizens they are meant to serve.
Security votes and related expenditures should be subjected to clearer disclosure requirements, independent auditing and legislative oversight. The government should also implement targeted employment, vocational training, agricultural recovery and education programmes in communities most vulnerable to armed recruitment and criminal activity.
Judicial reforms should focus on accelerating criminal trials, expanding access to legal assistance and ensuring that police officers, public officials and politically connected individuals are held accountable for misconduct.
Regional security cooperation remains necessary, but it must be accompanied by serious domestic economic and institutional reforms. Without addressing the conditions that make crime, extremism and armed violence attractive or profitable, Nigeria will continue to treat the symptoms of insecurity while leaving its foundations intact.
Nigeria’s Insecurity Crisis: Why Economic and Institutional Reform Matters
August 5, 2026
9:08 AM WAT
Amid escalating insecurity across the country, President Bola Ahmed Tinubu has stated that problems in the Sahel region, comprising Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, are predominantly fuelling insecurity in Nigeria. The President made this declaration on Thursday, July 30, when the Olubadan of Ibadan, Oba Rashidi Ladoja, paid him a courtesy visit at the Presidential Villa in Abuja.
While the President’s assertion has some validity as a broad regional observation, it does not adequately explain the deeply rooted and multifaceted challenges confronting Nigeria today. A comprehensive assessment requires moving beyond generalised regional explanations to address fundamental domestic problems, including corruption, maladministration, macroeconomic instability, institutional decay and social inequality.
“They committed murder by killing one of the teachers, and we were ready to finish with members of their families. Some of them are non-Nigerians. You see the problem in Mali, Burkina Faso, and the Niger Republic. It’s adding more fuel to our challenges. That is why we must enhance the capacity of the forest guards and create state police,” the President stated.
Strengthening forest guards and establishing state police are notable administrative measures that could improve national security. However, addressing localised symptoms without confronting systemic drivers such as corruption, poverty, economic hardship, maladministration and structural inequality will not resolve the country’s insecurity.
If we accept that Nigeria’s insecurity is predominantly imported, we risk avoiding responsibility for the conditions created at home. Instability in the Sahel undoubtedly places additional pressure on Nigeria, but the restoration of peace in the region would not automatically end the country’s domestic security crisis.
Unlike the Sahel region, where the modern escalation of insecurity began in 2012, Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country, has experienced severe terrorist attacks since 2009, following the killing of Mohammed Yusuf, the founder of Boko Haram, in Maiduguri, Borno State. Since then, insecurity has taken different forms, including Boko Haram, the Islamic State West Africa Province, ethno-religious conflicts, trafficking in women and children, farmer-herder conflicts and related armed violence, banditry and kidnapping. These have caused immense harm to ordinary people.
From a political-economy perspective, economic conditions profoundly influence social order, legal institutions and public security. As Karl Marx argued in the preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy in 1859, political and legal structures are closely connected to the material conditions of society. When an economy is in crisis, and legitimate opportunities for employment and livelihood disappear, criminal and armed groups find it easier to recruit members, while public trust and institutional stability deteriorate. Economic failure can therefore become a major driver of crime and insecurity.
Nigeria’s security challenges are closely connected to the deterioration of the economy and the decline of legitimate means of livelihood. Although armed groups may cross porous borders, the Sahel did not create the violence in Plateau or Benue. It did not create the police extortion and repression in Delta State that contributed to the #EndSARS protests of October 2020. Neither did it cause the #EndBadGovernance protests of August 2024, the country’s multidimensional poverty, or the large-scale plundering of public resources.
Persistent insecurity in Nigeria therefore stems not only from regional instability but also from deep domestic socioeconomic and institutional vulnerabilities. To achieve lasting stability, policymakers must address the critical internal factors sustaining violence.
Corruption and Maladministration
Official corruption remains deeply embedded in Nigeria’s political system. Reports frequently emerge of public officials diverting resources intended for functional schools, properly equipped hospitals, factories and other essential services for personal benefit. Funds meant to provide safety nets for the poorest members of society have also been embezzled.
In Transparency International’s 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index, Nigeria scored 26 out of 100 and ranked 142nd out of 182 countries and territories. The index measures perceived levels of public-sector corruption, with lower scores indicating more serious corruption concerns.
Corruption discourages international investment, weakens public institutions, and contributes significantly to Nigeria’s economic difficulties.
Government policies over the past four decades have also worsened the situation. From the Structural Adjustment Programme of 1986, import-dependent economic policies and the continuous devaluation of the naira to the removal of fuel subsidies without adequate social protection and the floating of the naira without sufficient industrial buffers, the Nigerian economy has become severely disoriented. Hunger itself has become a security issue.
Consider a 20-year-old man in Borno State who has no job, no access to education and little hope. If an armed group offers him money and a motorcycle, economic exclusion and the absence of viable alternatives may make him vulnerable to recruitment. Such a situation cannot be explained solely by instability in the Sahel.
A Weak Judicial System
Nigeria’s weak judicial system is another consequence of corruption and institutional failure, and it has become a major contributor to insecurity. Citizens feel unsafe when criminals and terrorists appear to escape punishment. The widespread belief that money can purchase freedom further erodes confidence in the justice system.
Wealthy and politically connected individuals are often perceived as capable of avoiding accountability, while poor citizens face a system that is slow, expensive, and frequently inaccessible.
One controversial example occurred on March 7, 2025, when the Supreme Court upheld the death sentence imposed on Sunday Jackson, a farmer from Adamawa State. The case arose from a 2015 altercation on his farm in Kodomti village, Numan Local Government Area, in which he killed a herder, Buba Bawuro, after being stabbed during a confrontation.
The case intensified public debate about self-defence, proportional sentencing and access to justice for vulnerable citizens. For many Nigerians, the judiciary is increasingly perceived not as the last hope of the oppressed, but as an institution that works more effectively for the powerful. Restoring confidence in the judicial system requires greater transparency, fairness and accountability.
The Politicisation and Weaponisation of Security
The politicisation of security has also contributed significantly to Nigeria’s crisis. Since the beginning of the Fourth Republic, security has frequently been used as a political instrument, particularly through unaccountable “security votes”.
Other examples include amnesty programmes that paid militants without creating sustainable employment, as well as the creation and subsequent abandonment of the Civilian Joint Task Force and local vigilante groups without proper demobilisation and reintegration plans.
An analysis of approved budget documents found that 32 state governments allocated a combined ₦525.23 billion to security votes and related operations between 2023 and 2025. Four states did not clearly disclose their allocations, while Ekiti State’s 2025 allocation was also unclear, indicating that the actual total may have been higher. The figure represents approved budget allocations, not necessarily the amount ultimately spent.
The governance of these funds remains weak and opaque, with security votes often disconnected from standard institutional planning, public financial management and accountability systems.
When security becomes a political patronage mechanism for winning elections or consolidating power, it ceases to focus primarily on the safety and welfare of citizens. This creates distrust, encourages self-help and contributes to further violence.
Unemployment and Poverty
Many people recruited by criminal and armed groups are young people who cannot find legitimate means of survival. Nigerian youths bear a substantial share of this burden because they make up a large proportion of the population.
Under the National Bureau of Statistics’ current labour-force methodology, the unemployment rate among young people aged 15 to 24 was 6.5 per cent in the second quarter of 2024, down from 8.4 per cent in the first quarter. However, 12.5 per cent of young people were not in employment, education or training, while informal employment across the wider labour market remained extremely high at 93 per cent.
These figures demonstrate that the unemployment rate alone does not fully capture the vulnerability of young Nigerians. Informal, unstable and poorly paid work, limited access to education and the absence of sustainable livelihoods can also leave young people exposed to recruitment by criminal and armed organisations.
When young people cannot find legitimate employment or sustainable means of survival, they become more vulnerable to exploitation by groups offering money, protection or a sense of belonging.
The Police, Social Justice and Impunity
The misconduct of the now-disbanded Special Anti-Robbery Squad, a tactical unit of the Nigeria Police Force established in 1992, was not created by the crisis in the Sahel.
According to the National Human Rights Commission, it received 3,724,822 human rights-related complaints across its offices in 2025. The figure represents complaints received by the commission, rather than an equivalent number of independently investigated and confirmed violations.
Hilary Ogbonna, Senior Human Rights Adviser to the commission, linked the complaints to systemic problems, including inequality, unemployment, weak institutions and limited access to justice.
When citizens fear the police more than they fear criminals, they are less likely to provide intelligence. When court cases continue for years, people may resort to taking justice into their own hands. When suspected kidnappers are arrested and released a few months later, the public receives the impression that crime carries few consequences.
The 2020 #EndSARS protests were not about the Sahel. They reflected a broken social contract between the state and its citizens, a contract that has yet to be fully repaired.
What the Government Must Do
There is no doubt that the Sahel is facing a severe security crisis and that instability in the region affects Nigeria. However, presenting the Sahel as the predominant source of Nigeria’s insecurity risks overlooking the domestic conditions that allow violence and criminality to grow.
To reduce insecurity, Nigeria must improve the material conditions of its people by addressing corruption and maladministration, strengthening the judicial and security systems, expanding legitimate employment opportunities and reducing poverty. Public institutions must also become more transparent and accountable to the citizens they are meant to serve.
Security votes and related expenditures should be subjected to clearer disclosure requirements, independent auditing and legislative oversight. The government should also implement targeted employment, vocational training, agricultural recovery and education programmes in communities most vulnerable to armed recruitment and criminal activity.
Judicial reforms should focus on accelerating criminal trials, expanding access to legal assistance and ensuring that police officers, public officials and politically connected individuals are held accountable for misconduct.
Regional security cooperation remains necessary, but it must be accompanied by serious domestic economic and institutional reforms. Without addressing the conditions that make crime, extremism and armed violence attractive or profitable, Nigeria will continue to treat the symptoms of insecurity while leaving its foundations intact.
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